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Abstract: Organizational economics makes important contributions to management theory. The focus 
of structural contingency theory is on the phenomena of the economy significant in organizational 
management theory and other new paradigms of organizational theories. However, the theory of 
organizational economics has hardly taken the multiple disciplines of organizational behaviour, 
strategy and theory, but is aligned with the management theories of psychology, sociology and policy 
dealing with human motivation, induction and enforcement as distinct from the theories of structures, 
strategies and planning to deal with designs appropriate for a computer on which the will of member 
compliance is not problematic (Donaldson, 1990). This paper aims at reviewing the organizational 
economics in detail, its definitions, implications and feature and Elements of organizational 
economics and also the prescriptive and descriptive organizational economics.  
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Introduction 
Organizational economics is one of the most important current researches of the 
general theory of organizations (Ulrich & Barney, 1984), including institutional 
theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), the theory of resource dependence (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967), and the model of population ecology (Hannan & 
Freeman, 1977). 
The theory of organizational economics is a new paradigm that enters the field of 
administrative theory (Barney & Ouchi, 1986). But like any new paradigm, 
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organizational economics has several questions for establishing management 
theories. As Donaldson (1990) the administrative relevance is achieved through the 
criticism of the managers’ behaviour. 
Organizational economics and organizational capabilities or resources are based on 
two streams of research contributing to the strategic organization (Argyres, Felin, 
Foss & Senger, 2009). Donaldson (1990) notes the need to determine the nature 
and potential of organizational economics in order to identify key issues and 
somehow pointing a path for resolution. 
This paper will discuss some aspects and definitions and also implications of one 
of the most important paradigms of management science i.e. organizational 
economy. 
Characteristic and elements of organizational economics, the methodological 
individualist perspective and other positive and negative approaches regarding the 
organizational economy will be detailed. Then the prescriptive and descriptive 
organizational economics, dynamic capability and opposition, complementarities 
and integration will be presented as well. 
 
Definitions and implications of Organizational Economics 
Organizational economics is defined as the area of knowledge that connects 
organizational capabilities with transaction costs, agency theory, property rights, 
and the information economy. 
The theory of organizational economics is the internal activities of organizations 
and business firms to analyze the factors that shape organizational structures and 
relationships in and among business firms. The organizational economics theory 
makes important contributions to the theory of organizational structures, vertical 
disintegration and corporate governance. 
The theory of organizational economics studies the nature of the obstacles to 
coordination of activities in and between firms. 
Economics examines organizational tasks of coordination and motivation of human 
activities in organizations to contribute to the design of forms and arrangements 
efficient organizational structures.  
The organizational economics theory takes into account the costs and benefits of 
institutional, organizational and contractual. Also Organizational economics 
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identifies organizational alternatives with their costs and benefits. And 
organizational economics emphasizes organizational efficiency with implications 
for the organization of transactions. Because organizational economics plays an 
insignificant role in the evolution of knowledge management, little emphasis is 
placed on the costs of activities. Phenomena such as firm-specific learning, work 
teams, communities of practice, knowledge integration, etc., Are derived from 
organizational economics? 
 
Organizational development of the economy 
The roots theoretical - methodological discipline- has its beginnings in the 
economy, although about the agency theory there was some discussion on these 
issues before in political science (Mitnick, 1975). The organizational economic 
theory begins with the work on the theory of the firm of Coase (1937) and 
Williamson (1975). Since the early seventies of last century, organizational 
economics has recognized that social relationships and learning processes do not 
happen the political vacuum that otherwise occur in a range of interests and 
different positions and power relations (Easterby-Smith, Crossan & Nicolini, 2000, 
p. 793). It has recently been applied to the analysis of internal situations of 
organizations. 
The theory of organizational economics studies the allocation of incentives and the 
influence of property rights on investment decisions and actions of individual 
agents. The theory of organizational economics studies the problems of 
coordination and motivation and incentive to the internal division of work and 
willing to functionality for performance measurement, redundant effort, etc. To 
resolve these problems, the proposed organizational economy organizational 
arrangements required by the different forms of governance, such as the allocation 
and delegation of authority, decision-making processes, compensation systems, etc. 
 
Characteristic and Elements of organizational economics 
The economic roots of organizational economics have led to characterize it under 
the following elements: 
Individualistic level method – due to all organizational phenomena which is 
explained as a result of agents with individual choice behaviour which means that 
the levels of analysis between the theories of economic organization and the 
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traditional administration are different. The organizational economy adopts 
methodological individualism reductionist (Broadbeck, 1968), while the theory of 
general administration focuses on an aggregate level of systems and organizations 
considering social facts Durkheim's (1938) have goals, objectives and realities 
beyond of individual attributes within systems and organizations (Buckley, 1967). 
However, the reductionist nature of organizational economics does not necessarily 
mean that they are inappropriate for tests done at the firm level. The reductionist 
nature of organizational economics cannot be disputed, as all economic models are 
based on organizational processes on human decision-makers and infer broader 
organizational phenomena (Barney, 1990) such as structure and strategy decisions 
and actions of individual managers. However reductionist models can coexist with 
non-reductionist models as an attribute of organizational economics does not 
prevent speech. The fact that organizational economics adopts a reductionist 
approach does not mean it cannot be applied in the analysis of organizational 
phenomena. And although organizational economics is reductionist does not mean 
or imply that firm-level analysis are not appropriate. 
Organizational economics doctrine is held in the social sciences known as 
methodological individualism, which states that social and economic phenomena 
should be analyzed as emerging conscious actions of individuals. Organizational 
economics is based on the model of homo economicus rational focused on pursuing 
their own interests and to maximize personal benefits were calculated in terms of 
wealth, status, etc. An important aspect of the relationship between organizational 
economics and management theory is the economic nature of individual motivation 
that is designed on the assumption of rational economic man. The economic 
approach to the nature of human motivation emphasizes the relationships between 
economic theory and the theory of organizational management that is based on the 
assumption that individuals pursue their own interests and maximize their profits or 
personal income. 
The methodological individualist perspective emphasizes that question neglects 
of knowledge management, which only operates at the firm level and it has a 
starting point strictly individualistic. Foss and Mahnke (2003) emphasize this 
individualistic methodological point of view that focuses more on the individual 
level rather than at the firm. The economy emphasizes organizational issues 
neglected in the literature of knowledge management which operates at the firm 
level and does not have an individual point of view explicitly. 
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Negative considerations of moral character of economic agents, managers, etc. are 
considered an inherent propensity to be opportunistic when maximizing their self-
interest and behave in ways that are moral hazard. The new language economist of 
the organizational economic theory tends to consider evaluative tone on the 
administrator as an individual who is prone to evasion of responsibilities and 
commitments, to be opportunistic and maximize their self-interest, to act to achieve 
insidious malice objectives, and to behave in ways that are moral hazard 
(Williamson, 1985). This evaluation feature presents some problems for 
management theory to the extent that the economy is seen as too general 
organizational and cynicism, which corrodes the relationship between academics 
and practitioners. The economy generates a theoretical organizational methodology 
scenarios based on the principle that managers act opportunistically and has come 
to believe that administrative actions are anti social and anti-organizational (Barney 
& Ouchi, 1986). Any other administrative behaviour falls outside the theory 
(Williamson, 1975). This assumption of opportunism needs not to prevent the 
integration of organizational economics and traditional management theory. The 
economy lacks organizational descriptions, in the terminology of economic 
analysis is difficult to identify organizational and administrative behaviours that are 
less harmful and more benign in nature. Moreover, organizational economics does 
not describe the administrative behaviours are motivated more benign, it is very 
difficult to identify the administrative behaviours harmful. For some theoretical 
contributions from organizational economics to management theory are repellent 
and cynical, corrodes and corrupts the collaboration between researchers, 
academics and practitioners of management science. The economy has serious 
organizational problems of theoretical and methodological relationships with 
management theory to achieve integration. In the literature on organizational 
economics, the administrative model is double-edged, as in the theories of agency 
managers are considered as economic actors and agents with interests opposed to 
individual principals or owners of firms; in theory transaction costs that it considers 
the administrative team in the organization that acts as a secondary computer 
administration. The organizational economy presents some challenges for 
management theory with regard to their integration, realism, simplicity, validity 
and evaluative tone (Donaldson, 1990). Assuming that managers act in ways 
specified by organizational economics, the task of management theory is to 
accurately record these behaviours even if they are outside of that is the truth. 
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Normative or positivist theoretical approach 
The organizational economics theory is developed within the management theory 
and focuses on developing a positive and normative theory. The foundations of the 
literature on organizational economics theory are positivistic and offer a deep 
appreciation of existing organizational arrangements. Positivist theories focus on 
an organizational economic management more focused on the original 
organizational economy that avoids criticism of administrators. The potential for 
positive organizational economics has been discussed in the matrix organizational 
structures and the vertical disintegration of the insurance companies for the 
reference to achieving credible commitments (Donaldson, 1990). Scholars and 
analysts of the discipline of the administration trying to criticize the 
administration's actions from the perspective of organizational economics delineate 
the behaviour of managers as opportunistic, self-interested, evasive of 
responsibilities and obligations (Kesner & Dalton, 1989).  
 
The Prescriptive and Descriptive Organizational Economics  
Donaldson (1990) argues that organizational economics would be more easily 
integrated with traditional management theory if its practitioners will focus on 
identifying the property description of the governance of institutions rather than on 
prescription. This shift in emphasis is necessary because the organizational 
requirements of the economy are essentially and necessarily anti administration 
suggesting that managers engage in opportunistic anti-social behaviours. 
Prescriptive pronouncements made in the organizational economics assume that 
administrative actions can be changed in ways that serve the best interest of the 
firm; however the likelihood of the offense of organizational economic analysis of 
prescriptive especially those who adopt the view administrative expediency 
contingent do not seem to outweigh the analysis of traditional management 
approaches prescriptive. From a broader perspective, the question of whether the 
organizational economics must also be prescriptive or descriptive in the centre of 
important concepts, such as balance, in some models according to Barney (1990). 
If the economy has important implications for organizational prescriptive and if the 
prescription is only relevant for social systems in organizational imbalance then 
economists should study the social systems of balance which does not necessarily 
imply that social economists must leave and leave all the concepts and models 
balance, but it is suggested that the understanding of resources and sources of 
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imbalance in social systems is an important organizational component of the 
economy. The phenomena of imbalance are more important in economic 
organization than many of the traditional economic theories. The observation that 
prescriptive organizational economics studies the phenomena of imbalance has 
important implications for the argument of Donaldson (1990) that organizational 
economics and traditional management theory can not be integrated. The 
traditional management models are relevant in models of organizational economics 
prescriptive. The attempt of prescriptive organizational economics and traditional 
management theory provide additional points of integration. 
Efficiency is a theoretical concern that the allocation of resources could contribute 
to the maximum possible value. This concept of efficiency derived the implications 
of organizational economics for creating and maximizing value depending on the 
forms of organization and economic governance. The rationality of the actors 
favors the election of organizational forms, structures of governance and contracts 
to maximize value.  
Organizational economics refers to the agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1989) (Jensen & 
Meck-ling, 1976) and the theory of transaction costs (Williamson, 1985) theories 
that are only a part of everything. The two main components of organizational 
economic theory are agency theory and the theory of transaction costs (Barney & 
Ouchi, 1986); it considers managers as economic actors. The economic theory is 
aligned with organizational management theories of psychology, sociology and 
policy dealing with human motivation, induction and compliance with the theories 
of the structure, strategy and organizational planning (Donaldson, 1990). 
Therefore, the model of organizational economic management is peculiarly a 
double meaning because they have ambivalence between economic theory and 
administrative theory and a challenge to management theory that quickly absorb 
organizational economics (Donaldson, 1990).  
The agency theory looks at systems of payments (Holmström, 1979), delegation of 
decision rights (Aghion & Tirole 1997), multitasking (Holmström & Milgrom 
1991), cases of asymmetric information and moral hazard, administrative 
commitments (Baker, Gibbons & Murphy 1999). In agency theory, organizational 
economics organizational systems can analyze in terms of their constituent 
individual actors rational economic man.  
Transaction cost economics (Williamson 1985, 1996), relates to arrangements for 
variables influence the motivation, knowledge, information, etc. In creating and 
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maximizing value. However, the motivational assumptions of organizational 
economics are still in critical discussion because it is considered from the 
organizational behaviour, the analysis of organizational economics are driven by 
cynical assumptions of human nature. In the prisoner's dilemma model of 
transaction costs do not imply complex mechanisms of governance specified by the 
economy but rather organizational axioms in their original forms and basic 
scenarios under more credible than those of an extended theory. The original focus 
of the transaction costs of organizational economics tends to focus on the 
perversity of distrust and a narrow economic calculus that put into question the 
arguments and reasoning extended on the basis of the economy so that 
organizational and body of theory may have convergence to traditional theories of 
management. 
Property rights in the allocation of rights and contract design in specific human 
capital investments to the firm when contracts are incomplete and agents acting 
opportunistically (Hart 1995).  
 
Motivation Theory  
The organizational economic theory offers a simple count of human motivation as 
opposed to the progress that has been in the organizational behaviour field. 
Organizational economics adopts a set of assumptions about what motivates human 
behaviour. Bounded rationality and opportunism are two attributes of human 
decision-making central to the analysis of organizational economics. This approach 
to human motivation in organizations is considered close to a wide range of 
existing motivational theories in the study of organizational behaviour and 
represents a challenge for research synthesis Logar motivational theory 
administrative theory approaches organizational economics and behaviour of 
organizations. Donaldson (19 909 notes that organizational economics theory 
emphasizes a very simplified motivation by reducing the chances that the model is 
integrated into the traditional theory of the administration because it requires the 
generation of ideas, approaches and more sophisticated models. I critique the 
organizational economy by adopting a narrow view of human motivation and 
behaviour neglecting and ignoring important scientific contributions of the models 
of organizational behaviour approach. For this reason, the economy is charged with 
having taken an organizational simplistic model of motivation individual human 
although there have been some attempts to develop a more sophisticated model of 
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motivation, which in some way reflects that the model of motivation focused on 
simple self interest as adopted is robust. The account that makes the theory of 
organizational economics of human motivation is closely related to the pre-existing 
theory of motivation in organizational behaviour, which, in terms of Donaldson 
(1990) presents a challenge to management theory from the theory of traditional 
organizational behaviour and new approaches organizational economic theory. The 
organizational economics has adopted the assumption that managers always behave 
opportunistically, assuming that simplifies the motivational structure of decision 
makers; despite the assumption that managers are prone to behaviour opportunist is 
not a required course for organizational economics (Barney, 1990). This limitation 
of the economy does not reduce organizational possibilities of theoretical 
integration with traditional management theories, but on the contrary increased 
integration of these possibilities. The simplified model of human motivation 
requires ideas and approaches of the more advanced models, more sophisticated 
reasoning, even though there have been few attempts to integrate these more 
sophisticated models in organizational economics. The simplistic motivational 
theories that emphasize the economy organizational integration rather than 
preventing provide important opportunities for such integration. The themes of the 
narrowness of motivational models in organizational economics and their offensive 
and prejudice against the system-level analysis and against the traditional 
management theory are discussed Donaldson (1990b).  
Theory of equipment is the optimal design of organizational structures under 
conditions of bounded rationality of individuals and absence of conflicts of interest 
(Casson, 1994). The organizational economics foresees the conflicts that may arise 
from these situations. The organizational economics perspective suggests that the 
successful creation of the efforts of the teams depends on the size of the team, 
negotiations between the individual and team incentives, rules of exclusion and the 
candidates of various degrees of uncertainty in design incentives (Foss and Mahnke 
(2003). The organizational economics urges managers to encourage individual 
contributions of team performance. 
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Confidence  
The organizational theory of the economy has room for study and research of the 
relations of trust. Theories focused on the study of trust rather than being classified 
in the field of organizational economics is considered within the broad range of 
conventional theories of organizational sociology. 
 
Knowledge Management 
Organizational economics provides the elements for the practice of knowledge 
management. The analysis of organizational economics is essential to sustain 
disciplinary knowledge management and processes of creation and integration of 
knowledge. Organizational economics research advances knowledge management 
with refutable propositions relevant to the practice. Approaches to organizational 
economics have applications to the creation as knowledge integration. 
Organizational economics (Coase, 1937, Demsetz, 1988, Jensen and Meckling, 
1992, Williamson 1985) study of knowledge of the organizations that characterize 
firms as institutions of the knowledge (Conner & Prahalad, 1996). 
The organizational economics perspective on the creation of knowledge shows that 
incentives for knowledge creation teams prevail in practice firms, as Foss and 
Mahnke (2003) suggest that teams rebuttable proposition using combinations of 
individual incentives and exclusion rules that are more effective in creating the 
knowledge that teams rely on the control of the clan. They also argue as irrefutable 
proposition based on the economics of organizational knowledge creation, the 
teams that use combinations of individual incentives, team incentives and rules of 
exclusion are more effective in creating the knowledge that teams that rely on 
control clan. It is believed that the theory of organizational economics is an 
approach that offers little to the learning processes in organizations (Madhok 1996) 
and do not necessarily conceptualize firms as knowledge-based entities. But we 
must recognize that the perspective of organizational economics has much to offer 
to give support to the knowledge generated in the signatures, so understanding the 
creation of this knowledge is not trivial. The organizational economics perspective 
suggests that learning-based team, is a costly mechanism of knowledge creation 
need not be limited to the provision of incentives. Therefore, organizational 
economics suggests that firms investing in common knowledge and engage in 
substantive knowledge sharing in the presence of high interrelatedness of firms 
performing tasks under conditions of low uncertainty.  
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Foss and Mahnke (2003) argue that organizational economics theories, such as the 
theory of transaction costs, agency theory, team theory, the theory of property 
rights have significant contributions to the development of knowledge management 
and can extend the theory and practice of knowledge management. The perspective 
of organizational economics suggests that learning-based computers are a costly 
mechanism of knowledge creation and the provision of incentives requires the 
solution of other problems. The organizational economics approaches take into 
account that the creation of knowledge in teams leads to substantial cost benefits. 
 
Corporate Governance 
Organizational economics is the corporate governance in terms of agency theory to 
rival the stewardship theory (stwardship) research of organizational behaviour and 
tends to be ignored. With regard to a potential positive approach organizational 
economics research contributes to organizational structures and corporate 
governance structures (Williamson, 1985) and also has the potential to develop into 
other directions relating to different aspects of organizational structures. 
Organizational economics may be sufficiently flexible to act as a law covering the 
proposals on corporate governance opposite to those brought against him 
(Donaldson, 1990).  
Foss and Mahnke (2003) develop proposals based on organizational economics 
with respect to how firms can encourage employee investment in firm-specific 
knowledge, solve problems of incentives to create knowledge and equipment to 
make choices between alternative media in the creation, integration and sharing of 
knowledge.  
While the researchers conclude that organizational economics has an important role 
in the disciplinary foundations of knowledge management, literature neglects its 
study. Corporate culture is essentially an embodiment of signals (Kreps, 1990) that 
makes credible incentive provisions which confirm that the administration is 
committed to approaches that are opportunistic in dealing with subordinates and 
employees that they induce high levels of learning investments.  
The theoretical and empirical research in organizational economics emphasizes the 
contributions to the recruitment vertical integration (Lajili, Madunic and Mahoney, 
2007). There is sufficient empirical evidence in support micro analytical approach 
organizational economics to analyze the behaviour of vertical integration 
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(Mahoney, 2005). Organizational economics has tried very little about the 
organizational heterogeneity and differences in the sustainable performance of 
organizations. 
 
Organizational Capabilities 
The organizational capabilities approach emphasizes the theory of organizational 
diversity and differences of sustainable performance. 
The organizational capabilities approach has not investigated the organizational 
forms and governance arrangements relating to the creation of differences in 
organizational capabilities. Capacity building implies organizational governance 
issues through the design of structures, forms and organizational arrangements to 
improve decision-making processes. Organizational capacity building and resource 
acquisition are essentially decisions about organizational boundaries using 
approaches of transaction costs and property rights. Human capital is an important 
component of organizational capabilities. Jones, George and Kosnik (1989) 
developed a growth model of the firm that combines elements of organizational 
economics to the concept of bias and heuristics drawn from research in cognitive 
psychology (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The resulting model suggests that firms 
can grow and be bigger than traditional organizational economics course with 
simple self-interest. Additional work that integrates organizational economics 
approaches of organizational behaviour, social psychology, anthropology and 
related disciplines will be very successful (Barney, 1990).  
 
Opposition, Complementarity and integration 
Scholars argue that organizational economics and organizational capabilities are 
different and opposite, others argue that although each has different theories, are 
complementary to organizational strategy. The complementarities of the 
organizational elements such as payment plans, delegation of duties, monitoring 
methods (Milgrom & Roberts, 1990, 1995) lend support to the notion of stable 
governance structures (Thompson, 1967) (Williamson, 1996) combined with 
elements organizational predictable as evidenced by empirical research (Shelanski 
& Klein, 1995) (Prendergast, 1999). 
Finally, others argue that both approaches are integrated into a theoretical 
methodological significant. The processes of deep and systematic integration 
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between these two important fields, organizational economics and organizational 
capabilities, contribute to make major approaches to organizational behaviour, 
especially in regard to relations between the forms and arrangements with 
organizational and inter organizational processes and outcomes of organizational 
capacity building.  
There have been so far some approaches integrating between transaction costs, 
agency theory, property rights, the information economy and building 
organizational capabilities. The integration of economic approaches and 
organizational development of the organizational capabilities can contribute to the 
design of structures and forms of governance arrangements. 
Although there are differences in assumptions between organizational economics 
and traditional management theory, these differences are not the kind that prevents 
inter theoretical course and the integration between these models according to 
Barney (1990). The criticisms of organizational economics have been numerous 
and strong arguments. Barney (1990) distinguishes between two kinds of critiques 
of organizational economics, the scene where criticism and puts the emotional and 
questions about the spirit that gives rise to these criticisms of organizational 
economics to conclude that since the rational bases are very weak to doubt the 
organizational economics and organizational opposition to the economy should be 
based more on emotional reactions to having to share the territory of the theories of 
the organization and management with the economy. Have been tolerated different 
levels of analysis in traditional management theory and do not represent the only 
problems for theoretical discourse between organizational economics and 
traditional management theories. If the connections between specific models in 
organizational economics and traditional management theory are examined, the 
possibility of integration is very clear, because there are similar parallels. The 
dynamics of long-term population model emphasizes the ecology of the population 
that is different from the model of the driving forces towards equilibrium systems 
in organizational economics. Also the roles that they play opportunities and 
uncertainties in determining the performance of a firm are important in the 
ecological population and the prospects of organizational economics (Barney, 
1986). However, Barney (1990) does not suggest that the traditional economy and 
traditional management theory are the same thing because they have important 
differences in the assumptions and methods that do not necessarily prohibit the 
intellectual discourse and theoretical integration between the two models. Both 
Barney (1990) and Donaldson (1990b) consider organizational theory and 
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organizational economics are two equal intellectually and potentially can have 
collaborations theoretical - methodological productive. However, Donaldson 
(1990b) admits that there are obstacles in the mutual learning in the organizational 
economic approach that takes human motivation and interpersonal relationships at 
the level of analysis and value judgments about the administration, but a discussion 
reconsiders this issue can help break down any barriers between the emerging 
organizational theory and organizational economics. Donaldson (1990b) argues 
that the requirement that there must be an open dialogue for mutual learning and 
some form of synthesis between organizational economics and traditional 
management theory is not exceptional but questioned if it is a real possibility. 
Donaldson (1990b) believes that Barney (1990) offers an apology for the economy 
more however organizational obstacles and difficulties remain.  
 
Criticism of Organizational Economics Theories  
The criticisms of organizational economics are many and some of them very strong 
considering the impact it has had organizational economics in the general theory of 
organizations. It criticizes the Organizational economics literature that is not 
supported and acknowledges the important contributions of traditional management 
theories. Perrow (1986:2359 criticism of agency theory and organizational 
economics generally as dangerous and insidious compared to the critique of other 
theoretical models of organization. The negative reaction of Perrow's theory is 
based agency that considered to be more inclined to favour the main by the agent 
and therefore is more critical than other economic organizational theories, 
organizational position may be considered more of political sentiment in this 
debate. 
The discussion of Donaldson (1990) on organizational economics is a systematic 
critique of the difference from other traditions and calls for further research to 
understand the wide range of organizational phenomena that can be analyzed. 
Donaldson (1990) argues that differences in assumptions and scientific methods 
organizational economics separate from other approaches in organizational 
research and differences in the assumptions and methods are of conflicts, once 
settled theoretical integration is possible. Donaldson (1990) criticizes the attributes 
of the organizational model of the economy that hinder the intellectual discourse 
and theoretical integration with traditional management theory. Donaldson (1990) 
cites four attributes differences between the models of organizational economics 
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and traditional management theory and discourse prevent the integration of the two 
models. These differences in the attributes are different assumptions about human 
nature and the assumption of opportunism, different levels of analysis used, the 
theories of motivation used in the different models and the prescriptive and 
descriptive of the economy and other organizational different models.  
This debate that goes between the descriptive and the prescriptive is at the heart of 
economic analysis with implications for organizational models underpinning and 
organizational economics has been defined as mandatory. This economy develops 
prescriptive organizational issues that are relevant to models of phenomena of 
imbalances that could serve as a basis for organizational integration of the 
economy with the traditional theory of management.  
For prescriptive organizational economics, rather than the traditional economy, the 
analysis of the phenomena of imbalance is fundamental to understanding why you 
cannot integrate traditional administrative theory. Donaldson (1990) suggests that 
these differences are not a sufficient explanation of the response of traditional 
management theorists on organizational economics. Barney (1990) accepts the 
differences between the approaches of organizational economics and organizational 
research other approaches in terms of methods and assumptions, but feels that these 
differences are not sufficient to guarantee the extreme response to organizational 
economics put into evidence by some organizational scholars, who do not explain 
fully both the number and depth of the criticism, so that additional barriers must be 
sought in the theoretical discourse and integration. On the contrary, says Barney 
(1990), the emphasis of organizational economics simplistic motivational theories 
can provide important opportunities to support the economic integration of 
organizational management with the traditional theory, as long as both share a 
prescriptive intent. For its part, Barney (1990) argues that the relationship between 
these two models has many attributes of conflict between groups and argues that 
the winner of this debate between advocates of theories of organizational 
economics and management theories traditional organizational theories are 
considered as a field of study in general. The possibilities for integrating 
organizational economics with traditional management theory based on the 
connections between specific models Barney (1990) also raises the hypothesis that 
academic organizational response to organizational economics is economic 
imperialism or import of reasoning, methods and economic values to other 
scientific disciplines and also suggests that this debate is a conflict between groups 
that can be studied by social psychologists. Donaldson (1990b) replicates the 
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criticisms of Barney (1990), noting that there are grounds for doubting a synthesis 
between organizational economics and traditional management theory. For 
Donaldson (1990b) criticism of Barney (1990) ranks as the most emotional critique 
of organizational economics centred on criticism of Perrow (1981 and 1986) who 
reacts negatively to organizational theory and considers the agency theory with 
some quickly to be ready next to the main against the officer which is consistent 
with his position. A stay more critical to organizational economics to 
organizational theories is not surprising. Barney (1990) proposed the intellectual 
separation of the emotional but it would be more comfortable for the proponents of 
organizational economics is to consider all opposition to the organizational 
functioning of the economy as purely emotional, without any rational substance. 
The strength of the reaction of Perrow's economy is partly organizational 
explicable in terms of his long career in literature and who can see beyond the 
organizational political economy. There may therefore underlying basis of political 
sentiment in more than one side of the debate on organizational economics. 
Donaldson (1990b) points out that the strength of their criticisms of organizational 
economics are based on the apprehensions about the negative impact on 
management theory and argues that there are reasons to doubt that organizational 
economics lend themselves to synthesis the traditional management theory. 
Donaldson (1990b) notes that its position is not neither left nor right, but that is a 
concern of what organizational economy is doing to the traditional management 
theory, the academic profession of management and at least as practicing managers 
is outlined. Considers that it should fight like a turf war would be a dirty war in 
which the organizational economics tend only to provide the basic reasons for 
individuals without really considering the arguments of value.  
The reaction to the economy in general by the theory of organizations may differ to 
the reactions of organizational economics understood as agency theory and the 
theory of transaction costs and what is at stake is the relationship between 
management theory and organizational economics defined as agency theory and the 
theory of transaction costs.  
 
Conclusions  
The organizational economic theory was developed to give greater significance to 
the role of management in marketing organizations. The organizational economics 
theories focus on the neglected category of the economy as traditional theory of 
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government, which complicates the relationship between academics and 
administrators. It is difficult to determine a priori the potential contributions of the 
organizational economic theory, but only until this research paradigm has more 
findings.  
Organizational economics focuses on the compatibility of incentives to investment 
issues for the production and sharing of knowledge, but neglected the costs of 
incentives and benefits of the practices of knowledge management. According to 
Foss and Mahnke (2003), organizational economics suggests three options to 
provide incentives to employees to investment in firm-specific knowledge, such as 
high-powered incentives, promotion rules and give access to critical resources.  
Organizational economics addresses deal with these situations of conflict of 
interest that are central to the practice of knowledge management. Economic 
theories that focus on organizational conflict of interest and that are positive by 
nature live in what is known as credible transactions. 
 
Future Challenges  
Future research on organizational economics must develop and articulate the 
theories and hypothesis that complement derive new hypotheses and theories 
existing traditional organizational and administrative approaches to generate new 
theoretical - methodological and empirical approaches can enhance the scope of 
organizational theory. Organizational economics can make important contributions 
to management theory only if it enhances their development in variables such as 
motivation. 
The methodological individualist approach motivation and the systems approach 
for the coordination of team efforts, require research in the processes of integration 
and synthesis. Barney (1990) suggests that in their understanding of the limitations 
and potential is encouraged by the analysis of Donaldson (1990) and hoped that the 
limitations and potential of traditional management theories are encouraged by a 
careful study of organizational economics.  
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